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Domestic copyright law as we know it is under fire. The advent of the
internet; open-source software initiatives; peer-to-peer exchanges; a variety
of artistic, cultural, political, and scholarly projects; "click-wrap" contract-
ing; changes to default copyright rules-as well as a host of other phenom-
ena-have created messy and volatile debates. At the core of these debates
are dialogues of power and control and questions fundamental to the order-
ing and organization of our "information society." Copyright law is in-
creasingly politicized because many understand the production of even
innocuous cultural texts as a direct expression of power. I Debates about
copyright are thus full of subtexts; they are partly about law, partly about
profit, partly about access, and partly about who produces what. In an im-
mediate sense, the debates ask what role our legal system should play in
regulating the creation, use, and distribution of cultural and intellectual
products. What does copyright law do in the twenty-first century? What
should it do? In a larger sense, the debates are about who manufactures
what meanings-and what our culture and economy become.2
Many argue that copyright has gone too far, protecting commercial
culture at the cost of noncommercial, benefiting private rights holders to
the detriment of the public domain, and inhibiting streams of inputs neces-
sary for continued artistic and intellectual development. A number of pri-
vate initiatives have launched to address a specific subset of these problems
perceived in our current copyright scheme: its failure to give copyright
owners a simple means to allow use of their work. The permissions process
can be cumbersome, if not prohibitive, and private actors have attempted to
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007. The author wishes to thank the scholars
on whose work she relies, Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie, and the Chicago-Kent Law Review edito-
rial staffs of 2006 and 2007.
1. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1105, 1106 (2005) (positing a Marxist
Revolution in the "rise of open source production and dissemination of cultural content").
2. See Severine Dusollier, Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?, 26 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 281 (2003).
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create modularized contracts that rights holders can use to pre-authorize
use of their work.
Most notably, software development saw the rise of "open source" and
"copyleft" licensing, of which the GNU General Public License ("GPL") is
a prominent example. A GPL builds upon existing copyright law, using the
existing rights of an owner, to attempt to allow public use of software while
at the same time preventing its privatization or commercialization. 3 Free
software released under a GPL would require that anyone who wants to use
and modify the underlying source code must release any modification un-
der a GPL, thereby keeping the software within the noncommercial realm.4
The intent is to further use and derivative development and avoid the priva-
tization of knowledge perceived to occur within the commercial realm.5
The goals also reflect democratic ideologies: "information that is truly
available to its citizens-for example, programs that people can read, fix,
adapt, and improve, not just operate."'6
Creative Commons, a non-profit organization based in the United
States, similarly attempts to build on existing copyright law by offering a
set of "some rights reserved" licenses designed primarily for authors and
artists. 7 Copyright owners who choose to release their work under a Crea-
tive Commons license disclaim some part of the default protection that
attaches under statutory law. For example, a musician might choose to
release a song under a "sampling license," which would allow almost any-
one8 to, for example, re-use portions of the song in a new composition. 9
Essentially, users of these types of licenses are reframing their "property
right" protected by federal law into a contract right ordered by the terms of
the agreement.
However, as a private solution, the Creative Commons scheme is not
without its problems, many of which rest in its dependency on contract law.
This Note examines criticisms of the Creative Commons projectO in the
context of copyright's larger policy goals and suggests that many of the
3. See Free Software Found., GNU Project Licenses, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html
(last visited May 25, 2006).
4. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 264-65 (2004).
5. See Free Software Found., supra note 3.
6. See RICHARD STALLMAN, Why Software Should Not Have Owners, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 45, 47-48 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002), available
at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf.
7. See Creative Commons, http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited July 15, 2006).
8. Advertisers are excepted from the permission.
9. See Creative Commons, Choose Your Sampling License Options, http://creativecommons.org/
license/sampling?format-audio (last visited July 15, 2006).
10. For the project itself, see Creative Commons, supra note 7.
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pros of the project could be retained, and many of the cons avoided, by
enacting its idea of limited-use licenses into the federal copyright statutes.
Part I examines relevant history of United States copyright law, the policies
copyright is intended to serve, and reviews arguments that because copy-
right has veered too far in favor of protection, it has created effects which
counter its intended goals. Part II discusses the Creative Commons project
and provides a brief overview of its licensing models and usage. Part III
examines specific criticisms of the Creative Commons licensing schemes,
such as problems in enforcement and potential conflicts with federal law
and policy. This section suggests that these problems arise primarily from
the project's attempt to provide standardized private contracts to supple-
ment federal statutory law. Part IV reviews other regulatory proposals and
poses a solution that examination of the Creative Commons project sug-
gests: a simpler statutory mechanism allowing a copyright owner to choose
a more limited copyright and, for example, easily dedicate a work to the
public domain, or choose to allow all noncommercial or educational use of
their work.
I. BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Copyright Policy Goals
"The 'reward' is a means, not an end." 1
The Constitution explicitly lays out an instrumentalist scheme for
copyright protection in the United States. Congress is given the power to
secure "for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries" in order to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts." 12 Although an author's "moral rights" in
her work are invoked as an explanation for aspects of United States copy-
right law, 13 and have been directly incorporated into some provisions, 14 the
I1. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 245 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an interesting dis-
cussion of Stephen Breyer's early work to challenge the economic justifications for copyright while he
was an assistant professor at Harvard Law, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 17-20 (rev. ed. 2003).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE,
§ 4.2.3, at 155-56 (2001) (highlighting U.S. protection of moral rights of integrity in derivative works
and the visual arts).
14. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 8D.06
(2006) (discussing moral rights in the Visual Arts Act of 1990).
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United States system of copyright protection is not primarily justified on
these terms. The rationale behind American copyright law is essentially
utilitarianl5 : copyright protections provide an economic incentive to cre-
ate. 16 Copyright protects ownership of the results of creative activity, this
provides rewards for the activity, and because creators are assured exclu-
sive ownership, their investment in creation and distribution can be re-
couped. 17 Moreover, copyright guards against a problem of free-riders; it
prevents people from imitating works, then selling the imitations at a lower
cost because they can avoid initial outlays, thus undercutting the original
producer. 18 Copyright's grant of a near monopoly is an exception to our
general preference for free competition 19 and the intervention is justified in
part on the theory that traditional market models do not work effectively to
regulate intangibles.
20
Copyright protections are thus in large part justified as a means to the
ends of public benefit. 2 1 With copyright protections providing proper in-
centives for creation, the public is served by an increase in the overall stock
of knowledge and information. 22 Additionally, because the creator is given
exclusive control for only "limited Times," the ownership eventually ex-
pires and allows public access. 23 Because the rewards to the creator are a
secondary concern, the monopoly thus has some limitations. 24 However,
the "two ends are not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends
by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones."'2 5
B. A Brief History
The history of copyright law in the United States is a story of steadily
expanding protections.2 6 The first copyright act, in 1790, protected books,
maps, and charts. Rights were protected for fourteen years if the work's
15. Dusollier, supra note 2, at 287.
16. But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 8 (arguing that while the basis for federal copy-
right powers is arguably instrumentalist, state common law traditionally relied more on natural rights).
17. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 142 (discussing Jeremy Bentham's affirmative case for
copyright).
18. Id.
19. Sharon K. Sandeen, Preserving the Public Trust in State-Owned Intellectual Property: A
Recommendation for Legislative Action, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 385,393 (2001).
20. Dusollier, supra note 2, at 287.
21. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
22. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243-44 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 205 (majority opinion) (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429).
24. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
25. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18.
26. Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36
LOy. L.A. L. REv. 123 (2002).
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ownership was registered.27 At expiration, a copyright owner could renew
for a single additional fourteen-year term.28 Over the next two centuries,
the scope of copyright's protection grew.29 Its subject matter expanded
parallel to changing technologies, coming to include photography, film,
and audio, as well as exclusive rights to public performance, dramatization,
and translation. 30 Originally copyright only protected against unauthorized
copying of the exact work of authorship. 31 This meant others could use the
material in other mediums. For example, music could be performed pub-
licly without permission from its creator; a playwright could adapt the story
from a copyrighted novel.32 However, beginning in 1909, copyright
changed from protecting the exclusive right to "publish" to protecting the
exclusive right to "copy," 33 and over time came to protect imitations and
adaptations as well.
34
The length of copyright protection increased incrementally, 35 through
Congress's adoption in 1976 of a term of the life of the creator plus fifty
years.36 A primary impetus behind the 1976 Act was the United States'
desire to obtain reciprocal international protections: Congress sought to
implement the requirements of the Berne Convention, 37 the primary inter-
national agreement respecting copyright, to which the United States be-
came a party in 1989.38 In 1998, Congress expanded the general term of
protection to the life of the creator plus seventy years.39
27. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 6.
28. Epstein, supra note 26, at 123.
29. Id. at 123-25.
30. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 6-7.
31. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 1-2.
32. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 8 (2001).
33. Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at sec. 6.
34. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 1-2.
35. The general term of protection expanded significantly through acts in 1831, 1909, 1976, and
1998. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2003); Epstein, supra note 26, at 123-24.
36. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195.
37. See Michael Jones, Eldred v. Ashcrofi: The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension
Act, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 103-04 (2004).
38. The Beme Treaty was first signed in 1886; France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were
among its founding members. It was revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, and 1971. The 1908 revision out-
lawed formalities, which was a reason the United States did not become a signatory until 1989.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 150-52. Goldstein attributes the United States' willingness to join the
multilateral treaty to its progression from being a cultural importer to its modem-day status as a cultural
exporter.
39. The Copyright Term Extension Act, also known as the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act, became Public Law 105-298 on October 27, 1998, and was codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (2002). A primary concern detailed in the debates was the protection of American intellectual
property in world markets. See 144 CONG. REC. H 1456, H 1456-57 (1998).
20071
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In this most recent term expansion, the 1998 Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act ("CTEA"), Congress's prime concern was the protection of
American works abroad and it sought to parallel protections afforded by the
European Union ("EU") to European works as of 1993. Under the terms of
an EU Directive, extended protection would be available for American
works in EU member countries only if the United States also instituted a
term of the creator's life plus seventy years. 40 As argued in debates in the
House, the extended "protection is worth hundreds of millions of dollars
for works produced by Americans."' 41 A Congressional Research Service
Report estimated that the net value of the Act's extra twenty years of pro-
tection for American copyright holders would be several billion dollars.
42
In 1998, Congress also created additional expansions through the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in order to implement the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.43 In 1994, the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Agreement had also
provided further protections 44 by, among other things, creating interna-
tional enforcement measures through a procedure by which member coun-
tries can legally institute trade sanctions against a member country failing
to comply with TRIPS's standards. 45
The Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 ("BCIA") wrought dramatic change in U.S. copyright law by
effectively ending the use of "formalities. '46 In the United States, prior to
these Acts, a copyright holder had to take affirmative steps in order to se-
cure copyright protection for a published work.47 At most times, the for-
malities required were registration, deposit, and notice. 48 For example, an
owner might provide notice both through registration and through affixing
a "©" to the published work.
40. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205.
41. 144 CONG. REC. at H1457.
42. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, §§ 12A.01-02.
44. Some scholars see TRIPs as the beginning of a marked shift in the scope of protection. See
Giovanni B. Ramello, Private Appropriability and Sharing of Knowledge: Convergence or Contradic-
tion? The Opposite Tragedy of the Creative Commons, in DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 120 (Lisa N. Takeyama, Wendy J. Gordon & Ruth Towse eds.,
2005).
45. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 160-61.
46. See Epstein, supra note 26, at 124.
47. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 494 (2004); see also
Epstein, supra note 26, at 124.




Formalities carried the risk that an owner could unintentionally lose
rights to their work through a simple failure to comply. 49 Moreover, com-
pliance under the registration system could be costly and the consequences
of noncompliance severe. 50 The cost of the system required a creator to be
able to foresee monetary value for their work. 51 Different nations having
different requirements magnifies the problems of formalities in interna-
tional copyright 52; by removing formalities, the process of securing protec-
tion domestically and internationally is streamlined. Thus, in order to avoid
the problems of formalities, to become a signatory to the Berne Conven-
tion, and to gain the advantages of reciprocal recognition of copyright, the
United States successively removed formalities in its copyright scheme. 53
However, these changes also dramatically altered copyright's default
rules and their effect on the public domain. 54 Prior to the 1976 Act, works
without affirmative acts of protection remained in the public domain, which
meant the works could be used without creating legal liability. After the
Copyright Act and the BCIA, the default rules switched. Rather than works
being unprotected by default, all "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression" 55 are automatically protected-from the
crayon sketch of a fourth grader to the novelist's draft manuscript. 56 A
creator no longer needs to expressly claim a right, thus implementing Con-
gress's goal that "the outright omission of a copyright notice does not
automatically forfeit protection and throw the work into the public do-
main."'57 Instead, a creator who wanted to allow public use of a work would
have to expressly disclaim rights.58 A user who wanted to claim a work
49. Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 (Jan. 26, 2005).
50. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 493.
51. Id. at 513-14.
52. Id. at 545-46 ("[R]equiring an author (or publisher) to inform himself about the requirements
of the law in countries with which he has no familiarity, and then to obtain and fill out forms in a vari-
ety of languages ... would be difficult, expensive, and often result in unintentional noncompliance and
the loss of valuable rights.").
53. See Epstein, supra note 26, at 124; Jones, supra note 37, at 104.
54. The meaning of "public domain" is disputed; it might be generally defined as "the opposite of
legal protection." See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 9A.01. Others define the public domain as
more than an "absence of protection," characterizing it as "a legal category unto itself." Id. Others put it
more critically, defining the public domain as what remains "after all the private interests had been
allocated[,] ... the carcass ... left after the intellectual property system had eaten its fill." See Hunter,
supra note 1, at 11 11.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
56. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 13. Some types of works are categorically excepted from copy-
right protection, e.g., works created by the federal government. See 17 U.S.C. § 105.
57. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 146 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5762.
58. Sandeen, supra note 19, at 393.
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was abandoned would generally also have to point to some affirmative act
by the owner negating her rights.
59
Thus, while copyright owners previously had the burden to secure
their government-granted monopoly, the burden is now effectively re-
versed.60 Because the default is protection, anyone wishing to use a work
now bears the burden of seeking permission. These statutory changes sim-
plified a creator's ability to secure protection by restructuring a largely
conditional, voluntary system into an unconditional scheme. 61 However,
the unconditional rules now protect millions of works which have no com-
mercial intent and created no statutory means for the owner to voluntarily
disclaim those protections.
C. Problems of Overprotection
"[W]ithout a legal monopoly not enough information will be produced
but with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be used."'62
The underlying rationale for the 1976 Act and subsequent expansions,
including compliance with international conventions, runs parallel to the
utilitarian rationale for copyright: if protections create incentives which
help to increase our intellectual stock, then greater protections will result in
greater incentives, which will ultimately result in a greater increase in our
inventory of intellectual products. When legislators extend the scope of
copyright protections, however, they rarely require empirical showings that
expansions will actually result in the production of more creative works. 63
Modem scholarship is replete with criticisms of the utilitarian rationale for
expanded copyright protection and its failure to account for how knowl-
edge and culture are actually produced. As the copyright balance tips in
favor of greater protection, these expansions may cause inefficient out-
comes, work counter to the needs of a knowledge culture, and lead to de-
creases in the production of knowledge. 64 For example, to the extent
current copyright law burdens the creative process with extreme and com-
59. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.06 (discussing the defense of abandonment of copy-
right).
60. See LESSIG, supra note 32, at 250. Note that under 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a), most copyright owners
in United States works do have to register their claims with the Copyright Office before bringing suit.
61. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 487-88.
62. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 135 (1988), quoted in Paul Gold-
stein, Comments on A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2573, 2574 (1994).
63. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 8.
64. Ramello, supra note 44, at 121-36.
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plex rules, it does little to encourage innovation and creation.65 There is a
forceful argument that the complicated scheme even for copyright duration
results in a confusion working against the goals copyright protections are
primarily intended to serve. 66
Some argue that the utilitarian rationale itself is based on fundamen-
tally flawed theory about how creative works are produced. Copyright pro-
tection and its underlying rationale are criticized as failing to account for
creative production's dependency on input.67 Because creative and intellec-
tual products are indebted to prior works, as overprotection creates an ex-
cessive rationing of creative goods, it can result in the inverse of Hardin's
tragedy of the commons. 68 The tragedy of the commons essentially posits
that because individuals each work to maximize their self-interest, if re-
sources on which all depend are unregulated, they will be overused and
depleted. "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest .... ,,69 Private property ownership can counter the
tragedy by giving individuals incentives for stewardship. However, an in-
tellectual commons poses somewhat different problems than Hardin's
model of finite, limited resources. Because creative and intellectual produc-
tion are necessarily dependent on preceding works, the advancement of
creativity and knowledge depends on a constant stream of input. 70 Al-
though copyright protections are intended to advance that input, as well as
provide for stewardship of the output, to the extent overprotection restricts
a supply from reaching the commons, the tragedy occurs before resources
ever reach a commons. 71
Copyright protections are also criticized for their commercial nature
and their over-inclusiveness: they fail to distinguish between commercial
work and noncommercial work, they are the result of commercial lobby-
65. LESSIG, supra note 32, at 4.
66. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Duration and the Progressive Degeneration of a
Constitutional Doctrine, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 189, 192 (2005) ("[D]iligent users of copyrighted
works, and even their lawyers, seldom have access even to the basic facts necessary for applying the
law. The law's ultimate harm, however, is not the confusion itself. Rather, the harm is to the public
domain that copyright protection must facilitate if the law is to serve its purpose of advancing knowl-
edge and encourage the creation and cultivation of new works.").
67. Ramello, supra note 44, at 122-27.
68. Id. at 123-30.
69. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 19, 120 (Richard C. Ellickson et. al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
70. Ramello, supra note 44, at 124-27. Ramello also argues that a direct application of private
property models to intellectual realms fails to account for the collective nature of knowledge: "there can
be no knowledge without meaning.... [and] no meaning without a human group to share it." Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 127-30.
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ing,72 and they work to the benefit of commercial culture. 73 Copyright re-
lies on policies designed to stimulate creation through the regulation of
specifically market-driven forces. Protection is intended to correct the mar-
ket's inability to effectively regulate the production of intangible goods. 74
However, market forces represent only one aspect of creative production.75
Not all creative production is justified by market motivations, and not all
commercial works retain value over time. As a result of expanded protec-
tion, works produced as early as 1926 are still protected, yet a report pro-
duced by the Congressional Research Service indicates that only about two
percent of works between fifty-five and seventy-five years of age retain
commercial value. 76 The system largely prohibits public use of the other
ninety-eight percent of works that have little or no commercial value, thus
protecting works that retain no commercial benefit for the copyright holder
and contain no commercial incentive for production or publication. 77 Be-
cause of the statutory changes of 1976 and 1998, Justice Breyer estimated
in Eldred v. Ashcroft that by the year 2018, the number of protected works
with little or no actual commercial value will number in the millions. 78 An
objection to the over-inclusiveness of protection is thus that millions of
works are unusable by the public, despite an owner's lack of incentive to
commercially market the work, resulting in an overall depletion of our
cultural stock from policies which provide a benefit to only a small subset
of works which retain commercially viability.
Facets of overprotection may thus inadvertently create effects directly
contrary to copyright's goals of enhancing our supply of information and
arts. Jazz music, for example, relies heavily on pre-existing work and a
system of derivation, but the current copyright scheme has created signifi-
cant legal problems which can discourage the production of new works.79
As one legal scholar argued after he was asked by a law review to pull a
paper from the Social Science Research Network, an online research ex-
change, the copyrighting of scholarly journals such as law reviews them-
selves can be in direct tension with the goals of academic publishing.80 As
72. See, e.g., Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries & Peter S. Menell, Foreword: The Rise of
Internet Interest Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2004).
73. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 8-9.
74. Ramello, supra note 44, at 122.
75. Id. at 124-27.
76. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J. dissenting); see also Public Domain
Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
77. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 489-90.
78. 537 U.S. at 249-50 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
79. See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain't Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (2005).
80. Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 607, 608-10 (2005).
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another example, in 2003, when a group of students published emails
online from Diebold Election Systems, the largest manufacturer of elec-
tronic voting machines in the United States, which discussed flaws in the
software and the machines' vulnerability to hackers, Diebold claimed copy-
right infringement of its rights in the emails in order to bring the site
down. 81 This illustrates that at times there may be a severe disconnect be-
tween policy rationales and practice: a system allowing a company to use
copyright to protect emails which exposed flaws in the election system
seems to have little to do with promoting "the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."
Additionally, it is claimed that a property system ordinarily gives
owners a right to decide what to do with their property-even if that means
giving their property away. 82 However, if a copyright owner aims to en-
courage use of a work by relinquishing her exclusive rights sometime be-
fore seventy years after her death, there is no simple means, and no
statutory means, for disclaiming or limiting those rights. From the user's
side, even where an owner wishes to allow use, the transaction costs for
seeking permission to re-use the work in a new project can easily be pro-
hibitive. The costs of seeking permission alone thus may prevent works
from being used. 83 For example, in support of challengers of the CTEA in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the American Association of Law Libraries, the College
Art Association, and the National Writers Union filed amicus briefs provid-
ing examples of historical projects that were limited or abandoned because
of prohibitive permission costs. 84 Even the Library of Congress tailors
some of its activities around the difficulty of seeking permission.8 5 Al-
though almost any copyright system imposes inevitable costs on the public,
there may be significant harm where search costs are so high they prevent
reproduction, even where the author would have no objection, or where the
permission costs by themselves are prohibitive. 86
81. Boynton, supra note 33.
82. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 266.
83. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit,
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault eds.) (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 5).
84. Justice Breyer noted,
[T]he American Association of Law Libraries points out that the clearance process associated
with creating an electronic archive, Documenting the American South, "consumed approxi-
mately a dozen man-hours" per work. The College Art Association... describes the aban-
donment of efforts to include, e.g., campaign songs, film excerpts, and documents exposing
"horrors of the chain gang" in historical works ....
537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
85. Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005).
86. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Difficulties in identifying and locating copyright owners amplify these
transaction costs. With each subsequent expansion of the length of protec-
tion, these costs increase. Unlike real property, there is no title chain for
copyright ownership and the Copyright Act of 1976, combined with subse-
quent changes, effectively rid copyright law of its requirements for owner-
ship registration. 87 Prior to the Act, formalities such as registration and
copyright notices, "facilitated licensing by lowering the cost of identifying
rightsholders, moved works for which copyright was not desired into the
public domain, and encouraged the use of public domain works by lower-
ing the cost of confirming that a work was available for use."'88 Now, how-
ever, because every work defaults to protected and the terms of protection
have dramatically increased, even assuming a creator retained ownership,
permission can require searching for an owner years after the creator's
death and attempting to trace the estate through successions of state inheri-
tance laws. Additionally, unlike many other types of property ownership,
an owner of intellectual property has no responsibility to the public to care
for the property.8 9
Although some may argue these problems are moot because copyright
violations are primarily privately enforced, and the owner who wishes to
disclaim rights may simply refrain from enforcing their ownership rights,
this argument ignores the prohibitive effect of potential liability and the
tremendous transaction costs of uncertainty. Creative production can in-
volve enormous initial costs. For example, publishing companies, record
companies, movie studios, advertising agencies, and their insurers all de-
pend on a certainty of rights before undertaking production. 90 When an
artist claimed that the film Twelve Monkeys used a chair in its opening
sequence which infringed on his furniture design, he was able to obtain a
preliminary injunction against Universal Studio's further distribution of the
film-despite the fact that the film had already been released. 91 These
types of stories deter production of creative works where rights are unclear.
Moreover, where there is civil liability for copyright infringement, there
may also be criminal liability, including felony conviction and sentences of
87. Registration or pre-registration is, however, required in most cases before filing an infringe-
ment claim.
88. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 487.
89. See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV.
135, 148-49 (2004).
90. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 5-6.
91. Woods v. Universal Studios, 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see LESSIG, supra note 32, at
4. Another commonly told story is that of author Margaret Mitchell's estate's suit against another
author, Alice Randall, who told the story of Gone With the Wind from a slave's perspective.
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up to 10 years.92 As Kenneth Crews explains, because of the uncertainties
and liabilities, a potential user of a work may avoid using the work entirely:
With that decision, not only are you abandoning your pursuits, but
the subsequent readers and other users of your work also lose opportuni-
ties to gain from your project. You may modify your project to make
only limited uses that might be outside the reach of copyright protection
or within fair use or another exception. You may seek permission from
the supposed copyright owner. But identifying the rightful owner may be
part of the overall problem with determining copyright duration; the
owner may have disappeared, failed to reply to requests for permission,
or charged a high royalty. The transaction costs of permission include
not only cash payment, but also the burdensome process of securing
rights.
Finally, in the face of uncertainty, you might choose to absorb the
risk and use the work without permission, and, amidst that uncertainty,
hope the work actually is in the public domain. If it is not, you face risks
of legal liabilities that could undermine your efforts and leave you to pay
monumental damages.
93
As the Copyright Office explains in a request for comments on the
problem of "orphan" works whose owner cannot be identified, uncertainty
works counter to copyright's goals. 94 The "economic incentive to create
may be undermined by the imposition of additional costs on subsequent
creators wishing to use material from existing works." 9 5 Public policy is
controverted where subsequent creators are deterred from incorporating
existing works because of potential liability, and the public interest is
harmed where works in which no living person has an economic interest
cannot be used because of uncertainty over the work's status.96 Although it
may be argued that overprotection is the cost we bear to encourage creation
and international recognition, no rational system insulates itself from alter-
nate solutions-if they can be proven viable.
D. Legal Challenges to Expansions
Various attempts have been made to challenge recent expansions in
copyright protection, both on constitutional grounds and through amending
legislation. However, both the courts and Congress have refused these chal-
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14,
§ 15.01.
93. Crews, supra note 66, at 200-01 & n.67 (also noting that liability for infringement can be as
high as $30,000 per work infringed or $150,000 if the infringement is found to be willful); see also
Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Crea-
tive Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 375, 379 (2005).
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lenges. Courts have refused primarily due to deference to legislative copy-
right decisions. For example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, copyright holders
whose works were in the public domain challenged the Copyright Term
Extension Act as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power to se-
cure copyright for "limited times" under the Copyright Clause. 97 The Su-
preme Court found the extension to be within Congressional power.98 In
Kahle v. Ashcroft, litigants challenged the constitutionality of the 1976 Act,
the CTEA, the BCIA, the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, and the Su-
preme Court's decision in Eldred.99 They based one argument on the latter
part of the Copyright Clause, arguing that the burdens imposed on the pub-
lic domain by the abandonment of the registration and notice requirements
overwhelmed the constitution's authorization of copyright protections in
order to promote the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." 100 The court
characterized the position as arguing that "Congress should have enacted a
different balance between the rights of authors and the rights of the public."
It found that Eldred mandated deference to congressional copyright deci-
sions and that Congress had a rational basis for the enactments. 101
In 2003, Representative Zoe Lofgren proposed the Public Domain En-
hancement Act ("PDEA"), 102 which also drew support from Lawrence
Lessig, a Stanford law professor who represented the litigants in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, and is the founder of Creative Commons. 103 The statute would
have limited copyright terms to fifty years, but permitted owners to renew
indefinitely in ten year terms for a one dollar fee.104 The intent of the legis-
lation was to require a nominal affirmative act of renewal, thus attempting
to strike a balance by allowing abandoned copyrighted works to enter the
public domain, but minimizing any steps required to affirm rights. 105 The
bill was not passed.
97. 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
98. Id. at 199.
99. 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888, 1889-90 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Plaintiffs also claimed a number of
other constitutional violations by federal copyright laws.
100. Id. at 1895.
101. Id. at 1900.
102. Jones, supra note 37, at 103.
103. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Creative Commons is Rewriting Rules of Copyright, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2005, at EOI.
104. Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
105. Jones, supra note 37, at 103-06.
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II. THE PROJECT: CREATIVE COMMONS.ORG
"The free movement does not claim freedom for the user to copy and
counterfeit the work, only the ability of the author to grant this freedom
to subsequent users."
10 6
Private copylefit projects such as Creative Commons share copyright's
essential goal of increasing the supply and stock of knowledge and culture.
Creative Commons attempts to create a specifically private solution to the
problems of overprotection by building "a layer of reasonable copyright"
on top of existing law. 10 7 Specifically, it attempts to allow owners to easily
grant permission for use of a copyrighted work. Owners are offered simpli-
fied means to relinquish their rights or specify how their work can be used,
with the intent of allowing "people to build upon other people's work, by
making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
build upon their work."' 0 8 Thus, it uses property rights granted by existing
copyright law to both limit and extend copyright protections in order to
attempt to design a means for ensuring continued development. The project
is posited as straddling the middle of a debate between "All Rights Re-
served" and "No Rights Reserved" by creating systems for structuring a
middle ground of "Some Rights Reserved."' 109 Underlying the project is
also a desire to promote alternatives to a one-way, passive consumption of
commercialized culture. 10
Lawrence Lessig, the project's founder, argues that property laws have
always involved balancing private rights against public needs and that the
balance of intellectual protection has shifted too far:
[O]ur modem structure of regulation .... affects how culture develops
in a way that is inconsistent with our past.... [W]e who believe in our
tradition have an obligation to do something to recre-
ate.., balance.... to teach the world something that the modem rheto-
ric has confused: that innovation and creativity always exist in a context
of balance. That there are private homes and public roads. Private yards
as well as city parks. We have controlled spaces and a common space.
These resources coexist; and it's that mixture that is the surprising inspi-
ration for innovation and creativity." 'I
Creative Commons thus seeks to shift the balance towards public
needs by providing mechanisms for copyright owners to license public use
106. Dusollier, supra note 2, at 295.
107. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 282.
108. Id.
109. Id. at276-77.
110. See LESSIG, supra note 32, at 9.
111. Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 776 (2003).
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of works such as websites, scholarship, music, film, photography, and lit-
erature. Effectively, it seeks to streamline a permission process by allowing
owners to grant permission for certain uses of their work, on certain terms.
However, rather than the normal one-to-one of a contract or use license, a
Creative Commons license works as a grant of permission from one-to-
all--on the parameters specified by the one.
Founded in 2001, Creative Commons is a Massachusetts nonprofit
corporation1 12 but is based in San Francisco. 113 According to Creative
Commons, funding for the project ranges from a variety of individuals to
such notables as the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the
U.S. Department of State. 114 It has released versions of its licenses in a
number of countries beyond the United States and recently partnered with
Microsoft to create a licensing tool for use in Microsoft Office applica-
tions., 15
Creative Commons' foundational project was the release of a set of
"some rights reserved" licenses.11 6 At present, a user can choose from a
variety of licenses, or a combination of modular parts from a variety of
licenses. The primary licensing terms are, generally, Attribution, which
requires that when a work is used, credit be given; Noncommercial, which
authorizes noncommercial use of the licensed work; Share Alike, which
requires any release of a work using the licensed work to be under the same
terms; and No Derivatives, which specifies that the owner is not authoriz-
ing use of the work in any other work. The terms are then mixed and
matched into six main licenses, as generally charted below in a matrix from
greater to lesser protection, top to bottom. 117 There are also specialized
licenses for music sampling, music sharing, and, inter alia, granting copy-
right permissions to developing nations, as defined by the World Bank. 118
112. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 282.
113. Creative Commons, About Us: "Some Rights Reserved": Building a Layer of Reasonable
Copyright, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited July 20, 2006).
114. See Creative Commons, Support Creative Commons Today, http://creativecommons.org
/support (last visited July 20, 2006).
115. Eric Steuer, Press Release, Microsoft and Creative Commons Release Tool for Copyright
Licensing (June 21, 2006), available at http://creativecommons.org/press-releases/entry/5947.
116. See Creative Commons, supra note 113.
117. Creative Commons, Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/ li-





Attribution Non- Noncommercial redistribu- Distribution without
commercial No tion as long as work is not credit
Derivative modified and credit is Use in derivatives
given Commercial Use
Attribution Non- Noncommercial redistribu- Distribution without
commercial Share tion, derivatives with credit credit
Alike given, and licensing under Commercial Use
the same terms Use without the
same license
Attribution Non- Noncommercial redistribu- Distribution without




Attribution No Commercial and noncom- Distribution without
Derivatives mercial redistribution as credit
long as work is not modi- Use in derivatives
fled and credit is given
Attribution Share Commercial and noncom- Distribution without
Alike 119 mercial redistribution and credit
derivatives with credit Use without the
given and licensing under same license
the same terms




Once a copyright owner chooses a Creative Commons license, there
are generally three components to a licenses' distribution: the actual legal
license, a summary description in lay terms, and machine-readable tags,
which deal with online indexing. 120 There are also a set of symbols de-
signed as variations to the traditional copyright symbol, "©," which are
intended to provide notice of the associated license. For example, a work
which allows noncommercial re-use would be tagged with a symbol of a
119. Creative Commons describes the Attribution Share Alike license as being often compared to
open source licenses.
120. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 282.
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dollar sign in a circle with a line striking through it: (®). The licenses are
primarily designed for online use, with the general idea being that online
content is posted with a Creative Commons "Some Rights Reserved" but-
ton linking back to their site. However, use of Creative Commons licensing
schemes has not been limited to works distributed online. Even a basic
LexisNexis or Westlaw search for "Creative Commons," for example, will
retrieve a variety of scholarly works published originally in hard copy, but
under Creative Commons license terms.
Creative Commons has also attempted to provide means for a copy-
right owner to limit their copyright ownership to a shorter length of time, as
well as a means to relinquish ownership rights entirely. Under its "Foun-
ders' Copyright" (named for the Constitution's Framers), the copyright
owner enters a contract with Creative Commons to sell her copyright for
one dollar. On its part, Creative Commons grants back to the owner exclu-
sive rights to control the work for a term of fourteen or twenty-eight years,
and agrees to release the work into the public domain at the expiration of
the term, as well as list the work in a registry. Under its "Public Domain
Dedication," Creative Commons provides a form for a copyright owner to
create a certificate that they are dedicating a particular work to the public
domain, "for the benefit of the public at large and to the detriment of the
Dedicator's heirs and successors .... an overt act of relinquishment in per-
petuity of all present and future rights under copyright law, whether vested
or contingent, in the Work."'121
In its first six months, Lessig claims, over one million objects were li-
censed with Creative Commons licenses. 122 By March of 2005, the Wash-
ington Post reported that over ten million creations ranging from songs by
the Beastie Boys to BBC news footage had been distributed under Creative
Commons licenses. 123 Most recently, the Open Content Alliance, led by
Yahoo, is using Creative Commons licenses in its book digitization project
in hopes to avoid the copyright problems Google encountered in a similar
endeavor.124 Other uses include material for 500-plus Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology classes 125 and Supreme Court arguments downloadable
121. See Creative Commons, Public Domain Dedication, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
publicdomain (last visited July 25, 2006).
122. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 285.
123. Cha, supra note 103. Cha also reported that Shawn Fanning, the original developer of Napster,
with backing from Vivendi Universal, was working on software that would allow copyright holders to
specify permissions and prices for swapping.
124. See Katie Hafner, Technology: In Challenge to Google, Yahoo Will Scan Books, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 3, 2005, at C 1.
125. Cha, supra note 103.
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as audio files. 126 Through the Creative Commons website and Google, a
user can search for publicly available works using Creative Commons li-
censes. 127 Although the data is unstable, it appears that a majority of users
of Creative Commons licenses are choosing noncommercial options that
require attribution to the creator. The most popular license combinations
are the Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike, with thirty-three percent
of users choosing it, and the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives,
chosen by twenty-eight percent of users.
128
There may be a variety of reasons why a copyright owner might
choose to release some of their rights by assigning a Creative Commons
license. Furthering the use of educational materials, culture, and informa-
tion may be one reason, either because of institutional purpose, altruism, or
ideology. Social motivation may also be a cause. 129 Purely commercial
promotional strategy might be another. 130 Artists, writers, and publishers in
a variety of mediums have experimented successfully with releasing free,
some rights reserved, content in order to stimulate interest in content which
can be purchased. 131 Some creators use Creative Commons content until a
project has the financing to be produced commercially and, at that point,
seek full permissions from the copyright owner.132 Comparably, in the
software context, commercial businesses may support the use of copyleft
licensing because it allows them to offer commercial services supporting
noncommercial projects, or to sell commercial products relying on the exis-
tence of the noncommercial product. In the patent context, a company
might intentionally create a public resource if it is in its best interest to
prevent the resource from becoming privatized.133
Creative Commons' licensing models are also being used in other
countries. For example, the BBC, as part of the Creative Archive License
Group, now offers an archive of audiovisual content under a similar licens-
126. See About Oyez, http://www.oyez.org (last visited July 2, 2006).
127. See Creative Commons, Find, http://creativecommons.org/find (last visited July 22, 2006).
128. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 83 (manuscript at 14 nn.49-51) (citing initial data on Creative
Commons' license distribution, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5293 (last visited Feb. 25,
2005)).
129. See id. (manuscript at 10).
130. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 284-85.
131. See Cha, supra note 103; Hunter, supra note 80, at 620-21.
132. See Cha, supra note 103.
133. For an example in the patent context, see a description of Merck Pharmaceuticals indexing
eight hundred thousand gene sequences and placing them into a public database in order to avoid the
sequences being patented. Critically, "Merck sees gene sequences as inputs, rather than end products."
Patenting of the sequences would decrease availability and stall research and development on which




ing scheme, which allows noncommercial re-use. 134 The French Free Art
License, developed in 2000, offers a scheme similar to Creative Commons
licenses but is designed to work particularly within French intellectual
property law by recognizing and defending creators' moral rights.1
35
III. CRITICISMS: TRANSACTION COSTS AND UNCERTAINTY
Creative Commons is an attempt to modularize private negotiation
around statutory law in order to decrease the transaction costs associated
with encouraging re-use and free use. But how enforceable are the li-
censes? Although Lessig argues the licenses are "bulletproof,"'136 to
date,they have not been tested in U.S. courts, and Creative Commons itself
makes no guarantees.137 Although the Supreme Court recently cited swap-
ping "open content" collected by Creative Commons as a "legitimate non-
infringing use" of peer-to-peer software in a suit against the software's
distributors, the legitimacy of the licenses themselves remains uncertain. 
138
As long as enforceability is unclear, some prohibitive uncertainty remains.
For example, suppose I write an article and I want the public to have
easy access to it, so I choose to publish it under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Non-commercial license. 139 Under a Creative Commons "non-
commercial" deed, a user who wanted to republish the work is restricted
from a use that is "primarily intended for or directed toward commercial
advantage or private monetary compensation."' 140 However, it is not clear
what "primarily intended" means or how much intent will cause a use to be
"directed toward commercial advantage."
Suppose an educational website carries my article but requires a
membership password to access it. Is their use of my article a commercial
or noncommercial use? Suppose the site does not require a password, but
sells banner advertising on the same page to support its publishing costs. Is
134. See Creative Archive License Group, http://creativearchive.bbc.co.uk/index.html (last visited
July 19, 2006).
135. See Artlibre, Free Art License, http://artlibre.org/licence/lal/en/ (last visited July 19, 2006).
136. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 282.
137. Creative Commons explains in its FAQ section that it cannot help with enforcement. It refers
the query to "StarvingArtistsLaw.com," a listing site for legal organizations that provide legal assis-
tance to nonprofit arts organizations. See Creative Commons, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://creativecommons.org/faq (last visited July 12, 2006); StarvingArtistsLaw.com, Volunteer Law-
yers for the Arts, http://www.starvingartistslaw.com/help/volunteer/20lawyers.htm (last visited July
12,2006).
138. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 954-55 (2005).
139. See generally Creative Commons, Attribution-NonCommercial License 2.5,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/legalcode (last visited July 19, 2006).
140. Id. § 4(b).
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that "primarily intended" or "directed toward" commercial? If not, how
much advertising would make it "primarily intended"?
There are limited "noncommercial" and nonprofit uses provided for in
existing copyright law. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 118 allows for use of
certain works in "noncommercial" broadcasting and there is said to be a
common law definition of the meaning of "noncommercial." However, the
dominant lens to interpret the licenses would be contract law. 14 1 In a nego-
tiated contract, the parties' intent could be brought to bear on the meaning
of the terms. In a specifically commercial contract, industry practice might
provide context. But in a modular contract offered by Creative Commons,
whose intent would shape meaning and provide the backdrop?
Suppose a newspaper wants to pick up my hypothetical article from a
"noncommercial" website, include it in its daily business section, and serve
it on both a "free" website and in its print version of the paper available by
subscription. What can I enforce? Against whom? And, if any of these
hypothetical re-users in the chain are also unclear on what re-use would
infringe the "noncommercial" license, how much does my use of the Crea-
tive Commons license deter their willingness to republish the content?
These questions are critical. Although it can be argued that enforce-
ment issues would only emerge in cases of breach, because the project
seeks to encourage actual use, uncertainty undermines it and could cause
the project to accomplish far less than it seeks. 142 If a potential re-user is
unclear whether her use of the work would be authorized by the license,
she may be unwilling to risk liability. If a creator is unsure their restrictions
on use of the work would be enforceable, the creator may be unwilling to
employ the license. Because Creative Commons seeks to encourage use,
the answers as to how the deeds would be enforced-or not-and on what
terms, are essential for a party to determine its rights and responsibilities
should it release or use a work under a Creative Commons license. More-
over, because Creative Commons licenses are intended to extend to parties
not in original privity, how the deeds would be enforced against third-party
users is a central issue. If a third party using the work is not required to
honor the terms of the license, the licenses become meaningless.1
43
141. See Merges, supra note 133, at 198.
142. To the extent that free content competes with commercial, a potential for litigation by com-
mercial content providers also emerges. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 83 (manuscript at II n.45).
143. Id. (manuscript at 15).
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A. Enforcement Under Contract Law
The closest analogy to the Creative Commons license that has reached
the courts is the Free Software Foundation's GNU General Public License
("GPL"). 144 Although issues with the GPL have largely been addressed
privately through negotiation and settlement, some case law referencing the
GPL exists. 145 For example, a Seventh Circuit court found the GPL en-
forceable by its own terms; a user would generally be bound by the terms
of the GPL, although the license's restrictions were inapplicable in the case
as the result of an exception provided in the license itself.146 However, the
copyright to the software at issue, Bison, was held by the same organiza-
tion which created and distributes the GPL, the Free Software Foundation,
so its intent in the GPL was directly relevant. 147 For other parties, the GPL
appeared to be presumptively binding in Progress Software Corp. v.
MySQL AB. 148 In Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit found that distribution of software under a GPL was not evidence
that the owner intended to relinquish all ownership rights, specifically
rights to its trademark, because software "distributed pursuant to such a
license is not necessarily ceded to the public domain. ' 149 It might fairly be
said that no court has to date found the GPL invalid and that most courts
have referenced principles of contract law to interpret the license. How-
ever, even with the GPL, enforceability questions have not been conclu-
sively answered. 150
The GPL is also only roughly analogous to Creative Commons li-
censes; software is its own medium, sometimes protected under copyright
and sometimes under patent law or trade secrets. 151 Moreover, as compared
to the Creative Commons licenses, the GPL is used within a distinct indus-
144. For a definition and discussion of the GNU GPL, see supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
145. Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source and
Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 464 (2005). Carver published his article under
his own version of an attribution share-alike license: "Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire
note is permitted without royalty in any medium, provided this notice is preserved: 'This note first
published by the Regents of the University of California in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal's
Annual Review of Law and Technology."' Id. at 443.
146. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697-98 (N.D. 11L 2004).
147. Id.
148. 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
149. 261 F.3d 1188, 1198 (1 th Cir. 2001).
150. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software Move-
ment's Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1022 n.46 (2005) (citing a number of commentators
questioning the enforceability of the GPL).
151. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright & Literary Property §§ 48-50 (2004).
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try and relatively homogeneous community. 152 An interpreting court may
be able to draw from industry custom to find the meaning of ambiguous
terms in the GPL; because of their broad use, Creative Commons licenses
do not offer the same possibilities. If, as with the GPL, most enforcement
of the Creative Commons licenses also occurred through private negotia-
tion and settlement, little light would be shed on ambiguous terms. Because
of these types of ambiguities, Creative Commons may be far from its prom-
ise of eliminating the intermediaries. 1
53
If contracts, the licenses are essentially non-negotiated contracts with
a questionable exchange of consideration even between the original par-
ties. 154 The "shrink-wrap" nature of the licenses creates another set of is-
sues. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg is often cited as a leading case on the issue
of non-negotiated contracts setting the scope for a license. 155 There the
Seventh Circuit found a "shrink-wrap" licensing contract enforceable
where conduct constituted acceptance to a vendor's terms for the sale of a
good. 156 The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-204: "A contract for sale of goods
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including con-
duct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract."'1 57
However, in its explanation, the court did not limit itself to tangible goods:
A law student uses the LEXIS database, containing public-domain
documents, under a contract limiting the results to educational endeav-
ors; may the student resell his access to this database to a law firm from
which LEXIS seeks to collect a much higher hourly rate? ... [I]f the law
student... could not do that, neither can Zeidenberg. 1
58
Assuming a Creative Commons license was enforceable under the rea-
soning of ProCD as a contract between the first parties to it, the complexity
152. Elkin-Koren, supra note 93, at 420. Elkin-Koren points out that software users of copyleft
represent a small "elite" and informed group, where definitions are intensely negotiated and enforce-
ment may occur within the community itself, in contrast with Creative Common's attempt to create a
variety of licenses for the larger public.
153. See Creative Commons, "Get Creative" Short Film, http://creativecommons.org/learnmore
(last visited June 22, 2006); see also LESSIG, supra note 4, at 305 ("The costliness and clumsiness and
randomness of this system mock our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
their duty to change the way the law works-or better, to change the law so that it works. It is wrong
that the system works well for only the top I percent of the clients. It could be made radically more
efficient and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.").
154. Creative Commons itself is not a party to the agreements, it serves only as an intermediary.
155. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Perhaps it can be argued that by agreeing to release their work
under the terms of a GPL or Creative Commons license, a user is exchanging a limitation on their own
copyright in return for the limited right to use the offering party's intellectual property. This is essen-
tially a version of Creative Commons' stance. See, e.g., Creative Commons, supra note 139 ("The
Licensor grants you the rights contained here in consideration of your acceptance of such terms and
conditions.").
156. 86 F.3d at 1452.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 1454.
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of enforcement would escalate with each re-use. Suppose A writes a poem
and releases it under a ShareAlike Creative Commons license. B incorpo-
rates the poem into B's animation. 159 B passes away and estate C inherits
B's intellectual property. C sells the animation to D, who incorporates the
animation into a multi-million dollar IMAX extravaganza. A still retains
ownership of the poem under copyright law and, in absence of the Creative
Commons license, would likely be able to enforce her rights against D.160
If we assume the license has validity as a contract between A and B, A may
be able to enforce the ShareAlike terms of the license against B, but what
are A's rights against D?
Niva Elkin-Koren projects that any enforcement right A had against D
would likely not end up as a contract right, but a property right, because A
would be seeking to enforce his underlying copyright. 161 Essentially, the
licenses default back to standard copyright norms and "copyright takes
back it power."' 162 A could sue, for example, for damages for copyright
infringement, 163 or perhaps seek an injunction against release of the film
with his work. However, his chances of enforcing the contractual terms of
the Creative Commons license, which would have required the IMAX ex-
travaganza to be released under ShareAlike terms, seem less than slim. It is
further questionable whether the remedies available under the common law
of contracts, which seeks to return the parties to their original positions,
could effectually grasp A's intention or his loss.
B. Enforcement Possibilities Under Property Law
Another model that offers possibility for framing enforcement of the
licenses could be drawn from common law hybrid concepts of contract and
real property. Some have aptly described the licenses as a sort of "intellec-
tual easement." 164 The analogy of a real property covenant might also be
useful, if one considers the license a type of agreement between the owner
and the user accepting the license. Under an easement model, our legal
framework provides that the owner retains essential control over the prop-
159. The first part of this hypothetical is based on a similar example offered by Elkin-Koren, supra
note 93, at 403-04.
160. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 3.05.
161. Elkin-Koren, supra note 93, at 403-04.
162. Dusollier, supra note 2, at 286.
163. Perhaps A might also have claims for a tortious interference with contractual relations but this
area is largely considered preempted by copyright infringement. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
14, § 1.01.
164. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1032 (2003).
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erty, but that another has a limited right of use. 165 Critically, the concept of
either an easement or a covenant could offer a means to frame the rights
and liabilities when the property or the right is transferred. Contract law by
itself may prove ineffective as a means for understanding enforcement of
the Creative Commons' type of modular agreement because it is centered
on parties in horizontal privity166 and many of the Creative Commons li-
censes are intended to live through vertical privity. Some type of hybrid
framework however might provide a means for conceptualizing enforce-
ment of either benefits or burdens against third parties.
C. Conflicts with Federal Law
Under any of these conceptual models, however, enforcement of the
licenses would be left to the vagaries of the common law and variances by
jurisdiction. Any bright-line clarity available from a system based on fed-
eral statutory law would be lost. This could further escalate notice prob-
lems and chilling transaction costs, in addition to presenting a potential
conflict with congressional intent. Although the Creative Commons project
intends to create uniform models for easily granting re-use rights, thus low-
ering transaction costs, 167 the project carries the potential for conflicts with
existing rules of federal uniformity and statutory standards for notice. 168
When Congress enacted the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301, in 1976,
abrogating a dual system of copyright for published and unpublished
works, it specifically intended federal copyright to preempt common law in
order to further a constitutional goal of uniformity. As the House Report
explains,
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of de-
termining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and
in the separate courts of the various States. 16
9
165. See 3 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.02
(1994).
166. See Merges, supra note 133, at 198. Merges touches briefly on the privity problem and sug-
gests that Creative Commons hopes that the contract terms will run with the content.
167. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 93, at 385-86.
168. Use of the licenses may also create conflicts with the increased institutional use of technical
protection measures such as password protections. See, e.g., Jordan S. Hatcher, Can TPMs Help Create
a Commons? Looking at Whether and How TPMs and Creative Commons Licenses Can Work To-
gether (2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfmabstract-id=852285). Hatcher ana-
lyzes the viability of Creative Commons licenses for a public sector organization in the U.K. composed
of museums, libraries, and educators, seeking to streamline a permissions process while still needing
some capacity for password protection and concludes that there is no inherent incompatibility.
169. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745.
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The statute itself provides,
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright... are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equiva-
lent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State.1
70
Thus, yet another question remaining is whether in the singular or in
the aggregate the licenses might be eventually interpreted as preempted by
federal law. Although Title 17 states that it preempts state law, this has not
been interpreted as necessarily meaning that it preempts causes of action
for negotiated contracts. 171 Whether Title 17 preempts non-negotiated con-
tracts (such as Creative Commons licenses) requires a case-by-case analy-
sis and is also the subject of some disagreement among the courts. 172 For
example, ProCD would imply that federal law does not preempt an agree-
ment restricting user rights. The court maintained that "courts usually read
preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected." However, it also
found it "prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the
label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption clause: the variations
and possibilities are too numerous to foresee."'
1 73 Kabehie v. Zoland174
cites a minority position as holding that "state breach of contract causes of
action are never preempted by federal copyright law," whereas Green v.
Hendrickson Publishers175 found that "to the extent ProCD suggests that
no state contract claim is preempted, that decision has met with harsh criti-
cism." The Green court further found viable the proposition that "pre-
emption should continue to strike down claims that, though denominated
'contract,' nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of expres-
sive materials."
76
Critics also find additional conflicts between expanding a copyright
owner's contracting power and inherent limits built into the federal copy-
right statutes. 177 Copyrights granted under federal law are not absolute
rights or total monopolies; a copyright owner does not have a blanket right
of exclusion. 178 Federal antitrust regulation, for example, constrains the
170. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
171. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 1.01.
172. See id.
173. 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996).
174. 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
175. 770 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind. 2002).
176. Id. at 790 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14,
§ 1.0l(B)(1)(a)).
177. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 93, at 405-07.
178. Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOzo L. REV. 121, 124 (1999).
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scope of an owner's rights. 179 So, at times, does the First Amendment.
Similarly, the doctrine of fair use, which was codified into the federal
copyright statutes in the 1976 Act, 180 limits an owner's rights by allowing
others to have limited use of portions of a work "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research."''181.
In a few areas, compulsory licensing schemes limit the scope of the copy-
right owner's right to negotiate pricing. 182 Under one compulsory scheme,
for example, when a song is recorded with the author's consent, others can
cover the song if they pay statutorily prescribed rates per copy. 183 Some
have suggested it useful to conceive of copyright as a variable set of prop-
erty rights.
The criticism of giving primacy to a copyright owner's contracting
power is that although Congress has created statutory limits to copyright, 184
and has provided for affirmative defenses, scholars have found it theoreti-
cally possible for an owner to contract out of federal exceptions. 185 Con-
gress rejected an addition to the Copyright Act that would have expressly
provided that several of its statutory limitations trumped non-negotiated
licenses. 186 Similarly, the American Law Institute rejected an amendment
to the Uniform Commercial Code which would have provided that mass
market licenses could not trump copyright law, instead choosing to adopt a
position of neutrality on the issue. 187
179. The case against Microsoft is a classic example. See Andrea Ottolia & Dan Wielsch, Mapping
the Information Environment: Legal Aspects of Modularization and Digitalization, 6 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 174, 217 (2004).
180. HARRY G. HENN, HENN ON COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 223-24 (3d ed.
1991).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
182. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
673, 681-83 (2003).
183. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 15.
184. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 112-14.
185. There are also some statutory allowances for contracting out of exceptions. For example, 17
U.S.C. § 203 appears to expressly allow a contract to trump its thirty-five-year requirement, even
though it simultaneously has several provisions prohibiting authors from deeding their termination right
before the time expires. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(6) ("[Tihe grant, if it does not provide otherwise,
continues in effect .... (emphasis added)).
186. Gretchen Stoeltje, Light in Custody: Documentary Films, the TEACH Act and the DMCA, 20
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1075, 1106-07 (2004).
187. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in
the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 166 n.63 (1997). The proposal would have
amended U.C.C. 2B § 308 to provide that "in mass market licenses a term that is inconsistent with
applicable provisions of copyright law cannot become part of a contract." Id.
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Although the Creative Commons licenses specifically articulate that
they do not conflict with fair use exceptions, 188 the general possibility of
allowing property owners to extend their own ownership rights beyond
federal law forms the basis for some objections to Creative Commons as a
private scheme for solving problems of overprivatization. Elkin-Koren for
example argues that such an approach leads to an understanding of copy-
right as giving copyright owners nearly unilateral power in a way that
threatens to undermine concepts like fair use and free speech liberties. 189
Even real property rights are absolute only in a theoretical world.190
IV. DEFAULT RULES & STATUTORY PROPOSALS
Creative Commons, as a private scheme, offers some beginning ideas
towards ironing out inconsistencies between copyright's rationales and its
current realities. By creating simpler means for owners to contract around
copyright's default rules, it lessens the burdens and costs for an owner who
wants to encourage use of their work. However, the project has limits; it
also has potential problems with enforcement and certainty, as well as po-
tential conflicts with federal law. These problems are largely a result of the
project being a private scheme attempting to structure "a layer of reason-
able copyright"'191 on top of existing constitutional and statutory law. This
perceived need for private actors to perform self-correction on the copy-
right scheme also begs some questions. If we have a statutory system de-
signed to enhance the public supply of information and knowledge through
the granting of monopolies in order to create incentives to produce-why
don't we also have a statutory means giving creators a direct route to en-
hance the public stock, instead of leaving private actors to forge a circui-
tous route through common law? Why is there a need for Creative
Commons? Why isn't there an easier way in the statutory system for some-
one to limit their default protections, or to give up their ownership rights?
As it currently stands, someone wanting to limit their private ownership
rights bears both the uncertainties and the transaction costs. The elimina-
tion of formalities for copyright protections created a burden of formalities
to comply with (or invent) for copyright limitation and copyright donation.
188. See, e.g., Creative Commons, supra note 139 ("Nothing in this license is intended to reduce,
limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use, first sale or other limitations on the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner under copyright law or other applicable laws.").
189. Elkin-Koren, supra note 93, at 404-06.
190. Burk, supra note 178, at 126.
191. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 282.
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This may not be the most efficient or desirable way to distribute the bur-
dens.
There have been many proposals for public reforms, as opposed to
private reforms like copyleft, to eliminate some of the unintended problems
created by copyright expansions, such as the millions of orphaned works.
Proposals have ranged from suggesting minimal changes to the copyright
statutes, to advocating substantial changes to the Berne Convention, 192 to
returning to the old default rules, 193 or undoing copyright term exten-
sions. 194 For example, the PDEA intended to alleviate problems of works
falling into a "copyright black hole" for years on end by requiring affirma-
tive steps to renew copyright.195 Under this rationale, if it isn't worth it to
the author to renew, then it "isn't worth it to society to support-through an
array of criminal and civil statutes-the monopoly protected."'1 96 Lessig
has also suggested a competitive copyright registration system requiring
owners to pay periodic fees to maintain their ownership claim, modeled
after the current system for domain name registration. 197 Another proposal
to counter the problem of orphaned works is to create a type of two-tiered
licensing system.198 Similar to the pre-1976 scheme, an owner would need
to comply with a set of formalities to preserve full protection for a work,
but instead of all works which don't comply defaulting to no protection,
they would default to a standardized royalty scheme, somewhat like that
currently existing for covering songs. The intent of this scheme is also to
ease public access to works for which the owner did not have enough in-
centive to register, thereby filtering commercially valueless works "out of
copyright and focusing the system on those works for which it could poten-
tially do some good."']99
Other suggestions parallel an argument also found in the patent con-
text: that coherent bundles of rights should be defined.200 For example,
Lessig proposes undoing the changes we began in 1909 and returning to a
system separating ownership of copyrights from ownership of rights to
192. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 490 (suggesting the Berne Convention permit formalities and
grant reciprocal recognition of each country's domestic formalities, so that if an author's work was
protected under her country's domestic laws, it would also be protected under another country's laws).
193. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 290.
194. Id. at 292.
195. LESSIG, supra note 32, at 251.
196. Id. at 252.
197. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 289.
198. Sprigman, supra note 47, at 555.
199. Id. at 490-91.
200. See Merges, supra note 133, at 187 (discussing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998)).
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control the production of derivative works. He argues that strong derivative
protections made sense when copyright secured essentially commercial
rights, but now that noncommercial uses also default to protected, the scope
of the right to control derivative works should be reexamined.
201 Thus he
advocates separating the rights, with derivative rights running for a shorter
term and on a more limited scope.
202
However, some of the most workable aspects of the Creative Com-
mons project are that it attempts to work within the existing copyright
rules-without requiring major restructuring of domestic or international
law-and does not necessitate objection from commercial interests served
by the existing scheme. Although its stance has garnered objections,
20 3 it
seems ultimately defensible: enabling a creator to have better tools to make
a wider range of choices. And Creative Commons has shown, at minimum,
that there is a place for alternatives to near monopoly rights-even if the
figure of ten million works under Creative Commons' licenses were taken
skeptically.2
04
Many of the difficulties inherent in overprotection and in the Creative
Commons model might be alleviated by codifying optional limited forms
of copyright. For example, a codification of parts of the Creative Commons
model might be combined with other proposals. In an analysis of private
investments in the public domain, Robert Merges suggests enacting a pat-
ent law which would allow marketing a product or publishing information
with a "Patent Waived" notice. 20 5 He also suggests amending the Copy-
right Act to add a statutory "safe harbor" codifying some aspects of a GPL
in order to provide uniformity and notice. He suggests a federal statute
provide that if notice on a work was given through a specific symbol, such
as an "L" in a circle, to signify a limited copyright claim, the statute would
indicate that the owner had disclaimed some rights.
While a symbol such as an "L" denoting limited rights might not pro-
vide enough specificity, codifying aspects of a limited copyright does offer
possibilities. A statute might rely directly on the symbols developed by
Creative Commons or similar ones. The copyright statutes could provide,
for example, that an "NC" in a circle on a work meant that the owner au-
thorized noncommercial use of the work. A "PD" could mean that the
owner was donating the work to the public domain, or an "ED" could mean
201. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 295.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 83 (manuscript at 2).
204. See Cha, supra note 103 (providing the figure often million).
205. Merges, supra note 133, at 201-02.
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the work could be freely used in an educational context. A "BY" in a circle
could mean, as the Creative Commons symbol does, that the author permit-
ted use with attribution. Critically, if no registration or other filing is re-
quired, no formalities would be created and no significant burden would be
added to the federal system. However, such a system of codified symbols
could also offer the flexibility to develop an optional supporting registra-
tion system for work with limited copyrights, either federally or privately,
because protections would not be affected by registration.
In such a system, because the owner's permission would rely on statu-
tory law, rather than contracts, privity and third-party use would no longer
be an issue.206 Moreover, uncertainties of enforcement and the scope of use
allowed might be decreased if these limited uses were codified into uniform
federal statutes. For example, if a work was released with a statutory "NC,"
meaning noncommercial use was permitted, problems in defining "non-
commercial" versus "commercial" might be minimized. The statute could
provide a standardized definition or it could incorporate an existing statu-
tory definition. If the judiciary provided interpreting standards, these inter-
pretations would spring from a single source of federal law, rather than
from varying interpretations of contract terms under differing common law
jurisdictions. To the extent the meanings became standardized, it could
help to provide notice of the uses allowed for a work. Additionally, the
difficult issues of a contract potentially circumventing federal law and of
preemption might be avoided.
If uncertainties are minimized and permitted uses are clearly defined,
perhaps owners may be more willing to authorize limited uses, or to release
ownership rights when they have no use for them, thereby helping to alle-
viate the problem of orphan works. Incentives might also be created for
such a declamation of rights. Many proposals have suggested returning to a
system providing incentives for registration in order to minimize the prob-
lems of works being orphaned. Providing an incentive for donation and a
simple means to do so might also be effective. In the current system, a
copyright owner often has no reason to protect a work from being orphaned
when it has no commercial viability. One suggestion is to provide incen-
tives for donation to the public domain or into a public conservancy, much
as incentives are provided for the donation of artwork to museums. 207 Tax
incentives, such as are provided for property donation, might also be vi-
able, although valuation could present a difficult obstacle. If incentives
were combined with a simple, enforceable means to specify uses the owner
206. Id. at 202.
207. LESSIG, supra note 32, at 255.
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intended to be allowed for the work, perhaps the problems of orphaned
works could be decreased.
Key to any statutory proposal is finding a way to implement change
without derogating the requirements of copyright treaties to which the
United States is a party, and the enormous value these global protections
hold for United States cultural industries. 208 Changes that restructure de-
fault rules in our domestic law may be problematic. Many international
copyright treaties include guarantees of both minimal protections under
each country's domestic law, and the principle of "national treatment,"
which guarantees that the works of member countries will receive treat-
ment "no less favorable" than works produced domestically. 209 Under this
latter principle, statutory changes distinguishing between United States
works and foreign works should proceed carefully.
However, two potential means to avoid conflicts between domestic
changes and international copyright treaties are (1) to leave the minimal
guarantees of protections unchanged, and (2) to limit the application of
statutory changes to "United States works." Critically, merely providing a
statutory means for owners to allow certain uses of their work, e.g., "NC,"
or "ED," or "BY," or to relinquish their ownership rights, does not alter
copyright's substantive default rules or create burdens of formalities for
protection, which means conflicts with international conventions might be
avoided. Additionally, such a change could be made only available to
United States works. The United States copyright system already effec-
tively has a definitional infrastructure for a two-tiered system. Under 17
U.S.C. § 101, a United States work is essentially one published in the
United States or a work produced by nationals, domiciliaries, habitual resi-
dents, or legal entities headquartered in the United States. Difficulties with
international obligations might be avoided by limiting the application of
changes to United States works. The proposed PDEA, for example, pre-
sumably to avoid conflicts with international agreements, limited its appli-
cation to United States works by building on the definition existing in 17
U.S.C. § 101.210
208. Lessig, for example, does note where his proposals conflict with existing treaties, specifically
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the Agreement on Trade Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TRIPS Agreement); the WIPO Copyright Treaty; and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Id. at 331 n.14. For additional criticism of Lessig's proposals,
see Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig's Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REv. 2305, 2328-33 (2004).
209. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, § 3, at 61-63.




The largest objection to giving authors or artists simpler means to
limit their ownership rights is a historical concern that their choices will be
unwise or manipulated. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 203 contains a termina-
tion provision allowing authors to effectively cancel a grant after thirty-five
years in part because of concerns for an author's "unequal bargaining posi-
tion" and fears that an author may not be able to adequately value a work
until after it has been exploited. This attitude towards creators may also be
characterized as overly romantic and paternalistic.
Relatedly, there is concern that Creative Commons and other copyleft
models will promote a "gift culture," further devaluing creative works both
in society at large and in the minds of creators themselves. Sfverine Dus-
sollier points out that much of the rhetoric of the copyleft movement is not
about the rights of authors or artists; rather it is about the rights of users to
use and consume creative works.211 The promotion of both users' rights
and a gift culture will lead to "a weakening of the position of artists in the
cultural environment." Dussollier draws an analogy to domestic work:
there is an ideology that domestic work will be done by women, and done
for free, that fails to take account of the role as a social construct. She ar-
gues that creating or encouraging the expectation of "free" is antithetical to
promoting the economic or cultural position of artists.
Elkin-Koren poses a nearly opposite view of the normative framework
that might emerge. Her concern is that increased awareness of copyright
will lead to an increased commodification of creative works and an over-
commercialization: "Copyright to all may simply make property in infor-
mation more prevalent. '212 She argues that there are essentially two worlds
of intellectual property rights: the world of rights exercised by corporations
and the world of individuals. The internet she posits as a realm where indi-
viduals freely exchanged creative works without concern for revenue or
licenses. However, as licensing becomes more accessible, the creative
realm becomes increasingly commercial. Empowering authors to govern
their own work, she thus argues, could spread and strengthen the proprie-
tary regime in information. 213
Both positions are, perhaps necessarily, oversimplifications. Dussol-
lier's argument does not account for the savvy with which many artists
seem to be using their options under Creative Commons licenses to further
211. Sfverine Dusollier, The Master's Tools v. The Master's House: Creative Commons v. Copy-
right, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271 (2006).
212. Elkin-Koren, supra note 83 (manuscript at 13).
213. See id. (manuscript at 14).
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their own best interests-including their own commercial interests. 214 It is
also apparent that our culture can sustain a wide variety of pricing models.
Cheap stock photo databases don't seem to have ameliorated our love of
fine art photography; blogs don't seem to have threatened the market for
Pulitzer-Prize winning novels. Rather than cheapening creative works
overall, the proliferation of low-cost or free resources might have broad-
ened the breadth of the markets, as well as increased the diversity of voices
we hear and images we see. Elkin-Koren's argument relies on a model
stratifying the interests of corporations and individuals, which may be de-
scriptively reliable in some areas, but not in others. For example, more than
a quarter of design work in the United States is produced, not by corpora-
tions or individuals giving their work away, but by independent design-
ers.
2 15
Nearly any theory which attempts to explore the interplay between
culture, law, and commerce will ultimately rely on oversimplification, and
it is precisely because of this complexity that giving better tools to creators
to make their own choices seems a defensible position. At the minimum we
should more closely examine the ends created by our means. If the ultimate
goal of our policy is to enhance our cultural stock, at the least it seems a
creator or an owner should have more choices, and more workable choices,
about how to directly contribute, should they wish-not more burdens.
214. For a discussion of "Actual Use," see supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
215. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK (2006-07), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco. Among commercial and industrial design-
ers, fashion designers, floral designers, graphic designers, and interior designers, nearly thirty percent
are self-employed.
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